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THE ROLE OF ANTITRUST 
POLICY IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF AUSTRALIAN-NEW ZEALAND 
FREE TRADE* 
REX J. AHDAR** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To antitrust devotees, 1990 was the centenary of the US 
Sherman Act. To the New Zealand public it marked 150 years of 
nationhood. But more significantly, for present purposes, it wit-
nessed the achievement of free trade between two South Pacific 
neighbors, Australia and New Zealand. With justifiable pride, 
one Australian legal official could boast: 
[This] achieve[s] an international first in free 
trade in goods between two countries. Free trade 
will not be accomplished in Europe until 1992 or 
some time later under the U.S.-Canada Free 
Trade Agreement.1 
This paper examines some antitrust aspects of the Austra-
lia-New Zealand free trade accord. The first section will trace 
the development of trans-Tasman2 free trade. Efforts to liber-
alize trade between the two countries have a long history. The 
next part analyzes the role antitrust law played in the movement 
• Edited by David A. Stradley & Jeff Voight. The author prepared this article in 
1992 . 
.. LL.B. (Hons.), LL.M. (Cantaur). Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Otago, 
Dunedin, New Zealand. Fulbright Scholar, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley, 1991. 
1. Pat Brazil, The Developing Closer Economic Relationship between Australia 
and New Zealand, in FIFTEENTH INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW CONFERENCE (CANBERRA 4-6 
NOVEMBER 1988) PAPERS 309, 313 (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1980). 
2. The term "trans-Tasman" is shorthand for matters pertaining to both Australia 
and New Zealand. The Tasman Sea is the body of water separating the two countries. A 
synonymous term I will also use is "Australasia", i.e., Australia plus New Zealand. 
139 
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to free trade. The final two sections raise a number of outstand-
ing issues and problems yet to be resolved by Australian and 
New Zealand policy makers. 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF TRANS-TASMAN FREE 
TRADE 
That a free trade agreement should be struck between two 
neighbors sharing such common ancestry, language and culture 
is hardly surprising. To most outsiders, Australians and New 
Zealanders seem identical. Indeed, until 1841, New Zealand was 
a dependency of New South Wales, Australia's most populous 
state. Perhaps only the surprising thing is that bilateral free 
trade should have taken so long. It has not been for want of 
trying. 3 
The first formal trans-Tasman trade agreement dates to 
1922. This provided for preferential tariff treatment on some 129 
items. In 1933, all tariff rates between the two countries were 
brought into line with British rates. As a measure of wartime 
solidarity the Australian-New Zealand Agreement was signed in 
1944 to solidify cooperation between the two nations in respect 
of their developing economies. Both shortly thereafter became 
members of GATT in 1947. 
Trade r~lations were further formalized in the mid-1960's 
when the Governments signed the New Zealand-Australia Free 
Trade Agreement Treaty (NAFTA), which came into force in 
1966. Despite its title NAFTA never achieved full free trade. Al-
though from its inception a substantial proportion of tariffs on 
trans-Tasman trade were removed, and bilateral trade soared 
some 800 percent in the next 14 years, its limits eventually be-
came apparent. Principally, NAFTA suffered from the inability 
of negotiators to move goods not originally exempted into the 
free trade area of Schedule A:I. 
Commencing with a joint communique in March 1980 by 
3. The brief historical treatment in the text is drawn from Brazil, supra note 1, at 
310-313 and TRANS-TASMAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT. RESEARCH MONOGRAPH 1 (Alan Bol-
lard & Moira Thompson eds., N.Z. Institute of Economic Research and Institute of Pol-
icy Studies, 1987). 
4. Bollard & Thompson, supra note 3. 
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the Prime Ministers of each country, momentum gathered to 
form some sort of closer economic relationship, one which would 
benefit each in the face of an increasing hostile world economy. 
Such a relationship would build upon earlier legislative efforts 
while implicitly presuming the continuance of the special kins-
man-like friendship between the two countries. The result of all 
this was the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations 
Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA or simply CER), which came 
into force on January 1, 1983. The objectives of the CER treaty 
were to: 
a) strengthen the broader relationship be-
tween Australia and New Zealand; 
b) develop closer economic relations between 
the Member States through a mutually beneficial 
expansion of free trade between New Zealand and 
Australia; 
c) eliminate barriers to trade between Austra-
lia and New Zealand in a gradual and progressive 
manner under an agreed timetable; and 
d) develop trade between New Zealand and 
Australia under conditions of fair competition:' 
More specifically the treaty articulated the need for progres-
sive reduction and elimination of tariffs,6 quantitative import re-
strictions,7 revenue duties,8 export subsidies and incentives,9 and 
preferential treatment for domestic suppliers on government 
purchasing. 10 
On the legal side, it was thought that existing business laws 
were sufficiently dissimilar that freer trade might well be hin-
dered, thus Member States should: 
examine the scope for taking action to harmonize 
requirements relating to matters such as stan-
5. See J. Farmer, Towards a Single Trans Tasman Market: A Lawyer's Perspec-
tive, 33 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 39, 40 (1988). 
6. Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement, art. 4, §3 
(1983). 
7. ld. art. 5(3). 
8. [d. art. 7(2). 
9. ld. art. 9(1). 
10. [d. art. 11(1). 
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dards, technical specifications and testing proce-
dures, domestic labelling and restrictive trade 
practices. 11 
I shall return to harmonization of trans-Tasman commercial 
laws in the next section. 
The treaty, despite a relatively lukewarm reception at the 
time, nonetheless saw a significant expansion in trade, with 
trade doubling between the two nations in the next five years.12 
At the end of that period the treaty itself provided for a review 
of its operation. Dellow and Feil, in an excellent discussion of 
this entire topic, comment: 
It is in part a testament to the success of the 
relationship that by the time this review was re-
quired the immediate objective of the treaty had 
been largely implemented, with tariffs on nearly 
all items traded between the two countries re-
duced to nil. New Zealand Import licensing and 
Australian quota requirements had also been 
largely removed in relation to trans-Tasma 
trade.1s 
Since the treaty had already exceeded expectations, the 
Prime Minister of each country, Mr. Hawke (Australia) and Mr. 
Lange (New Zealand), resolved, following their . meeting in No-
vember 1987, that further acceleration was warranted. They set 
three goals for the 1988 CER Review: 
a) to bring forward the removal of tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions on goods from June 30, 
1995 to the early 1990's; 
b) to examine the Australian and New Zea-
land business environments to identify those laws, 
regulations or other government interventions 
that constitute impediments to free trade, and ex-
amine ways of moving such impediments through 
harmonizing approaches to these areas; and 
11. [d. art. 12(1). 
12. Jeff Waincymer, Developments in the Closer Economic Relationship between 
Australia and New Zealand, 18 AUST. Bus. L. REV. 167. 167 (1990). 
13. T. Dellow & J. Feil, Competition Law and Trans-Tasman Trade, in COMPETI-
TION LAW AND POLICY IN NEW ZEALAND (Rex Ahdar ed., Law Book Co., 1991). 
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c) to consider expanding the scope of 
ANZCERTA to cover trade in services. l4 
143 
The Review was completed in August 1988 resulting in the 
Protocol on Acceleration of Free Trade in Goods signed August 
18, 1988. The middle of 1990, specifically July 1, 1990, was fixed 
as the date for full free trade in goods, thereby hastening the 
process by five years. The Protocol addressed such matters as 
extension of the treaty to trade in services and the harmoniza-
tion of quarantine and customs procedures. In respect of anti-
dumping, the Protocol urged a bold departure from tradition. 
While anti-dumping action by the respective Member 
States was not absolutely prohibited under the· 1983 treaty, the 
original Agreement did obligate each country to exchange infor-
mation and consult prior to the imposition of dumping duties. 
Further, the treaty had stated that dumping was "inconsistent 
with the objectives of this agreement."ll5 The 1988 Protocol in its 
preamble now suggested: 
that the maintenance of anti-dumping provisions 
in respect of goods originating in other Member 
States ceases to be appropriate as the Member 
States move towards the achievement of full free 
trade in goods between them and a more inte-
grated market. 
Reservations that some might feel that complete abolition 
of anti-dumping would go too far were answered in the following 
way. Unfair international trading would now be addressed by 
domestic competition law suitably modified to proscribe preda-
tory conduct by overseas corporations affecting trans-Tasman 
trade. The date for both abolition of anti-dumping and exten-
sion of existing Australasian competition laws would be the 
same-July 1, 1990. The precise mechanics of these changes are 
set forth in the next part. 
One final aspect of the 1988 Review is worth brief mention. 
The two governments entered into a Memorandum of Under-
standing Between the Government of New Zealand and the 
Government of Australia on Harmonization of Business Law. 
This once more urged careful consideration of laws which might 
14. Id. at 26. 
15. ANZCERTA, supra note 6, art. 15(1). 
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impede trade and recommended yet further harmonization. 
The Review's extension of the treaty to services and cover-
age of such matters as quarantine restrictions was welcomed. 
However, there are still some outstanding matters. Dellow and 
Feil point to perhaps the most important gap: 
[T]he two governments could not agree on a free 
investment regime. While the operation of over-
seas investment rules create few problems at pre-
sent, in the past they have been a significant im-
pediment to trans-Tasman investment. The 
absence of an agreement securing a free invest-
ment regime is a significant potential cause of 
tension in the closer economic relationship. It re-
sults in the curious situation that the developing 
group of trans-Tasman enterprises that have sub-
stantial share holdings and operations on both 
sides of the Tasman, may, for the purposes of the 
respective foreign investment regulation regimes, 
be treated as foreign companies in both 
countries.18 . 
Hopefully the next review of the treaty, set down for 1992, 
will address this. 
III. ANTITRUST LAWS: THEIR ROLE IN THE FUR-
THERANCE OF FREE TRADE 
Recall that a concern of the promulgators of the 1983 treaty 
was that differences in the respective laws of the Member States 
might impede their closer economic relationship. Major changes 
to the competition laws of New Zealand and, to a lesser extent, 
Australia, henceforth ensued. These can be analyzed as two dis-
tinct phases. 
A. PHASE ONE: HARMONIZATION OF TRANS-TASMAN COMPETITION 
LAW 
Article 12(1) of the CER Agreement obliged the two nations 
to "examine the scope for taking action to harmonize require-
ments relating to ... restrictive trade practices." As things stood 
16. See Dellow & Feil, supra note 13, at 27. 
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in 1983, Australia and New Zealand had markedly different anti-
trust regimes.17 From 1974 when it enacted the Trade Practices 
Act, Australia had an avowedly pro-competition policy. The 
courts were the principal form for enforcing the law, and private 
individuals or firms could seek redress. In short, the Australians 
endeavored to reproduce the American antitrust laws in an Aus-
tralian social and economic setting. 
By contrast, antitrust in New Zealand was still modelled on 
the cumbersome United Kingdom model with its unwieldy ad-
ministrative machinery and absence of private enforcement. 
Moreover, the objective of the legislation was not competition as 
such, but a diverse range of "public interest" goals, such as in-
dustrial development, export trade and employment enhance-
ment. New Zealand antitrust was in the doldrums. 
Harmonization does not necessarily mean replication,18 yet 
in the context of trans-Tasman trade this is what largely oc-
curred. Comparisons of each country's systems yielded the ines-
capable conclusion that New Zealand should adopt the Austra-
lian system and not vice versa. Thus the New Zealand 
parliament passed the Commerce Act 1986, which came into 
force on May 1, 1986. The New Zealand legislation adopts in 
large measure the antitrust provisions of the Australian Trade 
Practices Act 1974. A companion New Zealand statute, the Fair 
Trading Act 1986, likewise adopted the Australian Federal con-
sumer protection laws. 
B. PHASE Two: EXTRATERRITORIAL EXTENSION OF DOMESTIC 
COMPETITION LAWS 
The movement to abolish anti-dumping laws in respect of 
goods originating from each other's country by July 1, 1990 did 
not stand alone. It was felt that some controls over unfair inter-
national trade practices were still required. The rather doctri-
naire view that removal of trade barriers would eliminate the 
incentive or scope for dumping was rejected. Accordingly, policy 
makers seized upon existing domestic competition laws. With 
17. See Farmer, supra note 5, at 39 for a brief summary. 
18. See John Farrar, Harmonization of Business Law between Australia and New. 
Zealand, 19 V.U.w.L. REV. 435, 445-447 (1989). 
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minor amendments, domestic antitrust could address problems 
of trans-Tasman predation. 
The principal focus of any change would be the monopoliza-
tion provisions: section 46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Aus-
tralia) and section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 (New Zealand). 
The New Zealand provision reads: 
36(1) No person who has a dominant position in a 
market shall use that position for the purpose of -
(a) Restricting the entry of any person into 
that or any other market; or 
(b) Preventing or deterring any person from 
engaging in competitive conduct in that or any 
other market; or 
(c) Eliminating any person from that or any 
other market. 
Section 46 of the Australian Trade Practices Act is sub-
stantially similar. One difference, however, is the threshold stan-
dard for illegality. Section 46 speaks of the firm having a "sub-
stantial degree of power in a market" instead of having a 
"dominant position." 
Given harmonization of the respective monopolization 
prohibitions already, modification to meet problems of trans-
Tasman misconduct by powerful enterprises was quite straight-
forward. The antitrust laws would apply to firms having domi-
nance not just in (say) the New Zealand market, but also per-
sons possessing a dominant position in an Australian market or 
a combined trans-Tasman market. Thus, on the same day (July 
1, 1990) anti-dumping legislation in New Zealand was amended 
to abolish measures in respect of goods of Australian origin,19 
the Commerce Amendment Act 1990 came into force. Specifi-
cally, a new section 36A became operational. This provision, en-
titled "Use of dominant position in trans-Tasman markets" 
reads: 
36A(1) No person who has -
19. The DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES ACT 1988 was amended by the DUMP-
ING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES AMENDMENT ACT 1990. 
8
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(a) A dominant position in a market; or 
(b) A dominant position in a market in Aus-
tralia; or 
(c) A dominant position in a market in New 
Zealand and Australia -
shall use that person's dominant position for 
the purpose of -
(d) Restricting the entry of any person into 
any market, not being a market exclusively for 
services; or 
(e) Preventing or deterring any person from 
engaging in competitive conduct in any market, 
not being a market exclusively for services; or 
(f) Eliminating any person from any market, 
not being exclusively for services. 
147 
Australia likewise introduced a new section 46A when it 
passed the Trade Practices (Misuse of Trans-Tasman Market 
Power) Act 1990, after which Australian anti-dumping measures 
ceased in respect of New Zealand goods.20 
There was still one more important amendment remaining. 
Each country's antitrust statute contained a provision purport-
ing to give the legislation some extraterritorial effect. Both were 
similarly worded. To take New Zealand's again,21 section 4(1) of 
the Commerce Act stated: 
This Act extends to the engaging in conduct 
outside New Zealand by any person resident or 
carrying on business in New Zealand to the extent 
that such conduct affects a market in New 
Zealand. 
The requirement that persons had to be resident or carrying 
on business in New Zealand obviously did not sit well with the 
20. The Australian anti-dumping statutes amended were the CUSTOMS TARIFF (ANTI-
DUMPING) ACT 1975, the CUSTOMS ACT 1901 and the ANTI-DUMPING AUTHORITY ACT 1988. 
See Waincymer, supra note 12, at 270, for a discussion of what Australia deems to be 
goods produced or manufactured in New Zealand. 
21. Australia's provision is section 5 of the TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1974. 
9
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new section 36A proscribing misconduct by persons dominant in 
Australian markets. Accordingly, the extraterritorial sections of 
each nation's Acts were amended. Thus, the Commerce Amend-
ment Act 1990 added section 4(2): 
Without limiting subsection (1) of this section, 
section 36A of this Act extends to the engaging in 
conduct outside New Zealand by any person resi-
dent or carrying on business in Australia to the 
extent that such conduct affects a market, not be-
ing a market exclusively for services,. in New 
Zealand. 
Finally, to ensure the extended jurisdiction would operate 
smoothly. in practice, ancillary amendments were made both to 
the antitrust legislation as well as to other statutes, dealing with 
evidence, procedure and enforcement of judgments. In New Zea-
land, the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1990 
made amendments to the Judicature Act 1908, the Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Judgments Act 1934 and the Evidence Act 
1908. Parallel changes also occurred in Australia.22 Some high-
lights are, from a New Zealand perspective, provisions for: 
The New Zealand High Court to sit in Aus-
tralia in appropriate circumstances; 
Judicial notice to be given to seals and signa-
tures of the Australian Trade Practices Commis-
sion and Australian Federal Courts; 
The Trade Practices Commission to act as a 
"conduit" for transmission of information and 
documents required by the New Zealand Com-
merce Commission in any section 36A investiga-
tion; and 
The New Zealand justice system to support 
sittings of the Australian Federal Court in New 
Zealand including punishing for contempt. of the 
Federal Court while it is sitting in New Zealand.28 
It should be added that the enforcement agencies of both 
sides of the Tasman, the Trade Practices Commission (Austra-
22. The TRADE PRACTICES (MISUSE OF TRANS-TASMAN MARKET POWER) ACT 1990 
amended the FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ACT 1976 and the EVIDENCE ACT 1905. 
23. Dellow & Feil, supra note 13, at 41-42. 
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lia) and the Commerce Commission (New Zealand) have for sev-
eral years maintained a close working relationship.24 In the wake 
of the new trans-Tasman monopolization provisions, the Com-
missions recently issued a joint statement.211 Reflecting the closer 
"enforcement" relationship, the statement explains that each 
Commission will (resources permitting), on behalf of the other 
Commission, undertake any "preliminary investigations of fact" 
necessary to determine if a potential defendant has the thresh-
old market power in its home country to warrant contravention 
proceedings. For example, the Trade Practices Commission 
would, at the request of the Commerce Commission, investigate 
an Australian corporation alleged to have breached section 36A 
to see if it has a dominant position in an Australian market. 
IV. COMPARING ANTITRUST TO ANTI-DUMPING 
POLICY 
There is a clear difference in policy between com-
petition law and anti-dumping law. Anti-dumping 
laws aim to protect competitors. Antitrust laws 
aim to protect competition. The latter are only 
interested in effects on individuals if those effects 
can be related to competition per se. On the other 
hand anti-dumping laws are not interested in 
whether conduct is competitive or not, in the 
wider sense, but merely whether there is material 
injury to a domestic industry or the threat of such 
injury arising out of dumping.2e 
It is commonplace to allude to the different goals of anti-
trust and anti-dumping law. Indeed, to the extent that a domes-
tic monopolist or oligopolist invokes trade relief or counter-
vailing duties against a more efficient foreign competitor, trade 
policy might be a vehicle to undermine competition policy. The 
point should not be pushed too far, however. As the quotation 
above recognizes, even antitrust law is prepared to protect an 
individual enterprise if this is necessary to stimulate competi-
tion in the market as a whole. 27 In certain carefully circum-
24. [d. at 27. The authors go on to discuss the future use of cross-membership to 
enhance cooperation between the two agencies. 
25. Enforcement of new trans-Tasman competition laws reproduced as Appendix 6 
in the TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT at 117-120 (1989-1990). 
26. Waincymer, supra note 12, at 271. 
27. See Union Shipping New Zealand Ltd. v. Port Nelson Ltd., 3 N.Z.B.L.C. 618, 
11
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scribed situations, it (antitrust) is prepared to protect the weak 
from the strong, to entertain notions of fairness. 28 Thus, like all 
generalizations, caution is required. 
Accepting, nonetheless, that the two may have conflicting 
goals, there is no dispute that the institutional framework and 
remedies are different.29 Enforcement is now in the hands of the 
respective antitrust Commissioners rather than customs officials. 
The remedies also differ. Instead of the imposition of additional 
duties up to the level of the "dumping margin," antitrust law 
sees a broader range of remedies available, viz. damages, injunc-
tions and pecuniary penalties. A central question is this: Is anti-
trust law, suitably modified, able to catch the kind of unfair in-
ternational trading conduct which the anti-dumping laws 
addressed? There are strong grounds for thinking otherwise.80 
Antitrust law, of course, knows nothing of dumping. How-
ever, it is accustomed to combatting the evils of so-called "pred-
atory pricing." This refers to the use of short-run price-cutting 
at a loss in the hope of driving out rivals and raising prices again 
in the long run. Judge Breyer in a helpful U.S. decision explains: 
a profit maximizing firm might sometimes find it 
rational to engage in predatory pricing; it might 
do so if it knows (1) that it can cut prices deeply 
enough to outlast and drive away all competitors, 
and (2) that it can then raise prices high enough 
to recoup lost profits (and then some) before new 
competitors again enter the market.31 
Dumping could be seen as a kind of "international" monop-
olization by means of predatory pricing. There should be no rea-
son then, at least in theory, why the monopolization provisions 
of current antitrust legislation designed to combat predatory 
640 (1990) where J. McGechan observed: "such provisions [as section 36 of the COM· 
MERCE ACT 1986) are directed at protection of the concept of competition as such. They 
are not directed at the protection of individual competitors, except insofar as the latter 
may promote the former." 
28. For example, much group boycott and resale price maintenance law is explicable 
only in these terms. 
29. See Dellow & Feil, supra note 13, at 39·40. 
30. See Waincymer, supra note 12, at 271: "[I)t can be stated with assurance that it 
will be much more difficult to attack transactions under competition law than was the 
case under anti·dumping laws." 
31. Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231 (1st Cir. 1983). 
12
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pricing could not be modified to combat dumping. This, as we 
have seen already, is what the Australian and New Zealand pol-
icy makers did. Section 46 of the Australian Act and section 36 
of the New Zealand Act were given extraterritorial effect. 
Is the analogy a sound one however? Is dumping simply "in-
ternational" predatory pricing? An examination of the two im-
mediately reveals some key differences. First, predatory pricing, 
at least in American antitrust jurisprudence, requires the notion 
of "below cost" sales. Price must be below cost, although there is 
a great debate on which cost (marginal? average variable?) and 
how it can be measured.32 However, as Applebaum points out: 
[T]here is no requirement that dumping or subsi-
dies involve below cost sales. Indeed, the more 
routine, garden variety dumping case is a price-
to-price comparison between the foreign market 
and the United States market that does not con-
sider cost at alps 
Secondly, the defendant in monopolization proceedings 
must possess substantial market power (Australia) or a domi-
nant market position (New Zealand).34 This is not a prerequisite 
for anti-dumping law. Thirdly, anti-dumping concentrates on 
the effects of the defendant's conduct-are prices abroad lower 
than those at home and is material injury suffered by local pro-
ducers. By contrast, sections 36A and 46A are drafted in terms 
of purpose. Dominant firms are caught if they use their eco-
nomic strength "for the purpose of' eliminating rivals, deterring 
entry, etc. The central inquiry is the defendant's purpose, which 
may however be established by inferences from conduct.311 None-
theless, whether the intended effects did (or did not) eventuate 
32. See Vijaya Nagarajan, The Regulation of Predatory Pricing within § 46 of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974, 18 AUSTRALIAN Bus. L. REV. 293 (1990), for a recent summary 
of the voluminous literature. 
33. Harvey Applebaum, The Interface of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An 
Antitrust Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 409, 412 (1987). 
34. For a discussion of this threshold requirement and, in particular, whether the 
Australian threshold represents a lower standard than New Zealand's see Lloyd Hamp-
ton, Section 36(1) of the Commerce Act 1986: An Analysis of its Constituent Elements, 
in COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN NEW ZEALAND, supra note 13, at 186-189. It should be 
noted that both §36A and §46A apply to single enterprises which possess significant 
market power. The predatory actions of a group of competitors possessing collective mar-
ket power would appear to be beyond the reach of the Act. See Dellow & Feil, supra 
note 13, at 36. 
35. See further Hampton, supra note 34, at 204-212. 
13
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is not strictly relevant. Thus the elements to success in monopo-
lization proceedings are quite different and by no means easy to 
satisfy. 
That predatory pricing is a difficult allegation to sustain in 
antitrust litigation is borne out by recent events both in Austra-
lia and the United States. In America, the Supreme Court in 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.S6 was 
skeptical of the entire doctrine. Influenced by Chicago School 
thinking, the Court commented that "predatory pricing schemes 
are rarely tried and even more rarely successful."s7 There is an 
understandable reluctance of courts to condemn pricing behav-
ior of large firms as "predatory" when it may be no more than 
healthy price competition.s8 In Australia and New Zealand pred-
atory pricing cases have been rare.39 New Zealand has had none, 
while Australia has seen only two: one an interim injunction ap-
plication where the issue was canvassed very briefiy,40 and the 
other where a plausible situation of predatory pricing was re-
jected by the Federal Court. The latter decision, Trade Prac-
tices Commission v. C.S.B.P. & Farmers Ltd.,n provoked dis-
may among enforcement officials and eventually led to an 
amendment to section 46 to ease the evidential burden upon 
plaintiffs.42 
Prevention of predatory prIcmg in antitrust law in recent 
times has a decidedly poor track record. There seems no reason 
why it should be proscribed any more easily and frequently in 
the international context. Quite the opposite. Claims of price 
predation where defendant and victim are geographically dis-
tant, where variables such as exchange rate fluctuations impinge 
and where potential entrants may spring from third countries to 
thwart recoupment by the defendant,'3 suggest predatory pric-
36. 475 u.s. 574 (1986). 
37. [d. at 589. 
38. See id. at 585: "But cutting price in order to increase business often is the very 
essence of competition. Thus, mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are especially 
costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect." 
39. See Nagarajan, supra note 32, at 320-324. 
40. Victorian Egg Mktg. Bd. v. Parkwood Eggs Pty. Ltd., 33 F.L.R. 294 (1978). 
41. 53 F.L.R. 135 (1980). 
42. See Hampton, supra note 34, at 209. 
43. Wyincymer, supra note 12, at 271-272: "In the global market, without an oligo-
polist or monopolist position, a predator who ultimately increases price after smashing a 
local competitor, will simply see importers change their source of supply." 
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ing is even more implausible in an international as opposed to 
domestic setting. 
One illustration seems particularly apposite here." Again, it 
is the Matsushita case. American television manufacturers foun-
dered under the Sherman Act in their claim that Japanese man-
ufacturers had conspired to predatorially price TV sets in the 
American market. Yet, earlier in 1971, U.S. manufacturers had 
successfully sued Japanese TV producers under U.S. anti-dump-
ing law.411 The clear implication is that it may be more difficult 
to combat unfair trading under antitrust law than under anti-
dumping law. 
If antitrust law is a weaker weapon than anti-dumping, does 
it really matter? There are two arguments here that suggest this 
loosening of control over unfair international trade is acceptable. 
The first is theoretical. A free trade market is simply one not 
conducive to dumping: 
Removal of trade barriers will . . . render dump-
ing largely redundant as the scope for price dis-
crimination between the domestic and export 
markets (a precondition for dumping) is reduced. 
In essence, the establishment of a free trade area 
under ANZCERTA will substantially reduce the 
incentives and ability by exporters to dump be-
cause of the risk of retaliation by competitors in-
cluding the possibility of arbitrage.46 
The second argument emphasizes the recent history of 
trans-Tasman dumping cases. The anti-dumping laws them-
selves were not proscribing much dumping since the CER Agree-
ment came into force.47 New Zealand, for example, saw some 39 
dumping complaints lodged between 1983 and 1988 against Aus-
tralian firms. Only two of these resulted in a finding of dumping. 
44. Douglas Rosenthal, Antitrust Implications of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement, 12 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 83, 85 (1989). 
45. COLOR PICTURE TUBES FROM JAPAN U.S.I.T.C. Pub. 367, Inv. No. 731 TA #67-370 
(1971). 
46. Brazil, supra note I, at 315. See also Dellow & Feil, supra note 13, at 36. For a 
contrasting view however see P. Nicolaides, Does the International Trade System Need 
Anti-Dumping Rules?, 14 WORLD COMPETITION L.& ECON. REV. 102, 105 (1990) (asserting 
that dumping and free trade have no direct or necessary connection). 
47. H. Keyte & Sandra Rennie, Changes in Anti-Dumping Laws, NEW ZEALAND 
TRADE DEVELOPMENT BOARD NEWS, Feb. 1991, at 21. 
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Australian statistics are similar.'s The anti-dumping laws had 
become largely redundant even before full free trade material-
ized. Their abolition and replacement with a weaker form of 
control (antitrust) thus represents little change. 
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TRANS-
TASMAN NATIONS AND THIRD COUNTRIES 
It is the early days for trans-Tasman free trade and it will 
be interesting to see the effects within the Australasian market. 
Equally interesting, however, and possibly more problematic, are 
the problems and issues arising with respect to third countries. I 
shall briefly sketch four areas worth further consideration. 
A. THIRD COUNTRY DUMPING 
The anti-dumping regimes of each Member State remain in 
place to counter dumping from third nations. A number of dis-
tortions and complications could ensue. Speaking from an Aus-
tralian perspective, Waincymer comments: 
The potential for dumping duties remains on all 
other third party imports into Australia. The 
changes will simply mean that those countries 
who face trans-Tasman competition have had 
their levels of effective protection reduced com-
pared to other Australian industries. That is an 
undesirable feature of the change!9 
He goes on to suggest: 
To remove anti-dumping duties from one source 
can only lead to inefficient resource allocation if 
importers of products sensitive to anti-dumping 
complaints shift their sources of supply from effi-
cient third country suppliers to less efficient New 
Zealand suppliers.oo 
The ultimate solution to such problems is of course the uni-
versal abolition of all anti-dumping regimes and replacement 
with extraterritorial antitrust law by all nations. As Waincymer 
48. See id. Of 34 cases from 1982-1988 only three resulted in anti-dumping duty 
being imposed. 
49. Waincymer, supra note 12, at 272. 
50. [d. 
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recognizes,61 and he is surely correct, such a multilateral accord 
seems a long way off if attainable at all. 
B. EXEMPTIONS FOR PURE EXPORT CARTELS 
A blind spot in the antitrust regimes of many nations, even 
the United States,&2 is the immunity granted to pure export car-
tels-arrangements between local firms to restrict competition 
between them but which affect foreign buyers and consumers 
not domestic consumers. This "nationalistic" approach to anti-
trust enforcement has received criticism recently. Moschel has 
put the case nicely: 
What is clear from the international practice of 
exempting pure export cartels from the applica-
tion of domestic competition law is essentially a 
traditional 'beggar my neighbor' policy. It leads to 
a paradoxical situation: if you stand up in the 
movies, you have a better view; if everyone does 
it, nobody is better off. as 
Neither Australia nor New Zealand is blameless in this re-
gard. Each has an identical export cartel immunity.1!4 So, for ex-
ample, section 44(1)(g) of the Commerce Act exempts contracts 
containing provisions that relate "exclusively to the export of 
goods from New Zealand or exclusively to the supply of services 
wholly outside New Zealand" if various procedural steps are 
observed. 
These export-directed exemptions have been overlooked in 
the recent legislative amendments. Certainly an exemption for 
export cartels seems just as inconsistent with the objective of 
free trans-Tasman trade as do anti-dumping laws, at least where 
the goods and services are bound for the other Member States' 
shores. Moreover, if single firm anti-competitive conduct can 
now be caught, notwithstanding its impact occurring overseas, 
why should concerned behavior not likewise be proscribed by 
Australasian antitrust law?&& Even if this apparent anomaly 
51. Id. at 273. 
52. See the WEBB-POMERENE ACT 1918 and the EXPORT TRADING COMPANY ACT 1982. 
53. Wernhard Moschel, International Restraints of Competition: A Regulatory 
Outline, 10 NEW J. INT'L L. & Bus. 76, 83 (1989). 
54. The Australian Provision is section 51(2)(g) of the Trade Practices Act 1974. 
55. Remember that both sections 46A and 36A are directed at a corporation or a 
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were to be addressed within the trans-Tasman context, the issue 
still remains with respect to third nations. New Zealand might 
still, for example, exempt export cartels where a nation other 
than Australia was involved. Furthermore, even if both Austra-
lia and New Zealand were to entirely abolish their respective ex-
port arrangement exemptions, they would face a world where 
these stubbornly persist. Again, the only solution seems to be 
some form of concerted multilateral agreement that such immu-
nities from domestic antitrust are beyond the pale.1I6 
C. OTHER PROBLEMS WITH THE EXTRATERRITORIAL OPERATION OF 
ANTITRUST LAWS 
Policy makers in Australia and New Zealand have made it 
clear that each country's extended antitrust legislation applies 
to the Crown and Crown Corporations. Thus New Zealand, for 
instance, inserted two express provisions into the Commerce Act 
in 1990:117 section 6A, which states that section 36A applies to 
Australian Crown corporations (and the Crown itself); and sec-
tion 6B, which eradicates any immunity for the New Zealand 
Crown and Crown bodies corporate in respect of section 46A of 
the Australian Act. Hence, doctrines of sovereign immunity have 
been explicitly rejected in the trans-Tasman context. 
What about the extraterritorial application of third coun-
tries' antitrust laws to Australia or New Zealand, in particular 
American antitrust? This has, of course, been a very hot topic 
for some time. As one American commentator laconically ob-
served recently: 
For most of the past century, the United States 
was the Lone Ranger of international antitrust 
with application of US law outside the territory of 
the United States often very unappreciated by 
foreign governments.68 
person, not corporations or persons, who use market power for predatory purposes. 
56. Professor Hawk suggests that "consumers worldwide would be better served by 
all countries applying antitrust laws rather than selectively applying them to promote 
each country's perceived 'net national welfare.''' See Barry Hawk, The International 
Application of the Sherman Act in its Second Century, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 161, 166 
(1990). 
57. COMMERCE AMENDMENT ACT 1990, § 6. 
58. Hawk, supra note 56, at 161. 
18
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 1 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol1/iss1/6
1994] AUSTRALIAN-NEW ZEALAND FREE TRADE 157 
That comment is an understatement when one considers the 
Australian experience with American antitrust in the late 1970's. 
The full saga is a long and interesting one but is unfortunately 
beyond the scope of this paper.1I9 In brief, the American firm, 
Westinghouse, commenced proceedings in the United States 
against some 29 foreign uranium producers, including four Aus-
tralian companies, alleging various cartel behavior in contraven-
tion of the Sherman Act. Under the so-called "effects doctrine" 
promulgated by Judge Learned Hand in Alcoa,60 the Sherman 
Act was seen to apply to foreign behavior having direct and sub-
stantial effects on U.S. import, export or domestic commerce. 
The Westinghouse claim as for treble damages totalling around 
6 billion dollars! A special Australian Parliamentary Committee 
established in 1983 to consider the problem of the extraterrito-
rial operation of American laws summarized the ensuing 
developments: 
Despite firm Australian representation to the US 
Administration opposing US attempts to regulate 
the legitimate activities of Australian companies, 
the US Administration and courts showed no seri-
ous concern for Australia's expressed interests. It 
was not until the Foreign Antitrust Judgments 
(Restriction of Enforcement) Act was enacted in 
1979 that the Westinghouse case was settled out-
of-court, even though involving over $11,000,000 
payable by the Australian defendants (together 
with their extremely high legal costS).61 
To smooth relations in this area, the United States, as it 
had done with other countries,62 entered into a cooperation 
agreement with Australia. On June 29, 1982, the two govern-
ments signed the Agreement between the Governments of Aus-
tralia and the United States of America Relating to Coopera-
tion on Antitrust Matters. However, this provision for inter-
government consultation was still felt inadequate to assuage lin-
gering Australian concerns that its national interests were not 
59. For an excellent account and one I have drawn from in this paper see REPORT 
FROM THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE. AUSTRALIAN·UNITED 
STATES' RELATIONS: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES LAWS (Aust. 
Govt. Pub. Service, November 1983) ch. 3 [hereinafter Joint Committee). 
60. United States v. Alcoa Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
61. Joint Committee, supra note 59, at 27. 
62. Namely Canada and West Germany. 
19
Ahdar: Australian-New Zealand Free Trade
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
158 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMP LAW [Vol. 1:139 
being sufficiently protected.63 Two years later saw a revised ver-
sion of its 1979 "blocking legislation"64 including the introduc-
tion of so-called "clawback" provisions, designed to enable Aus-
tralian defendants to recover the non-compensatory portion of 
multiple damages awarded to foreign plaintiffs. 
Although New Zealand has not had a Westinghouse type 
claim, it too followed suit and enacted blocking legislation in 
1980.66 Unlike Australia, however, neither a cooperation treaty 
with America, nor the passing of clawback provisions has so far 
resulted. 
Certainly in respect of each other, Australia and New Zea-
land have ensured their blocking statutes will have no effect af-
ter July 1, 1990 in relation to proceedings under sections 36A 
and 46A.66 There has been no alteration of the blocking legisla-
tion in respect to third nations however. In view' of the Westing-
house saga there would seem little reason to abandon it, espe-
cially in light of the European Court of Justice's recent 
decision67 to similarly adopt an effects doctrine in respect of the 
European Community. 
To complete this present discussion, it should be noted that 
both Australian and New Zealand antitrust statutes purport to 
have extraterritorial effect. The reach of the statute, however, is 
limited to situations where the corporation is resident or carry-
ing on business in New Zealand or Australia as the case may 
be.68 Hence overseas firms with no direct business connection to 
the nation in which their anti-competitive actions are felt are 
beyond reach. 
New Zealand and Australia have yet, to my knowledge, to 
63. Joint Committee, supra note 59, at 65. 
64. FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS (EXCESS OF JURISDICTION) ACT of 1984. 
65. EVIDENCE AMENDMENT ACT 1980 which enables the Attorney General to inter-
vene and restrict the production of evidence for use by foreign authorities where this 
would be prejudicial to the sovereignty of New Zealand or prejudice her trading, com-
mercial or economic interests. 
66. See for example, section 6C of the COMMERCE ACT (inserted by the 1990 
amendments). 
67. The Wood Pulp case (A. Ahlstrom Osakeyhitio v. Commission) 4 C.M.R. (CCH) 
§ 14, 491 (Sept. 27, 1988). 
68. See § 4 COMMERCE ACT 1986 (Austl.) and § 5 TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1974 (N.Z.). 
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flex their extraterritorial antitrust muscle. This is hardly sur-
prising in a world in which it faces much larger, more powerful 
nations and indeed, in the case of New Zealand at least, foreign 
corporations with assets in excess of the New Zealand GDP. 
D. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PACIFIC RIM TRADE? 
The CER agreement has been successful in stimulating 
greater trans-Tasman trade. However, a quick survey of 1990 
Direction of Trade Statistics indicates neither nation has an ex-
clusive preoccupation with each other. Indeed, the figures for 
June 1990 show New Zealand ranked only fourth as an export 
market for Australian produce, taking only a fifth as much (in 
dollar terms) as Japan, Australia's most popular foreign mar-
ket.s9 As an importer to Australia, New Zealand similarly ranked 
well down behind the United States, Japan, the United King-
dom and Germany. 
The same June 1990 figures show that from New Zealand's 
perspective, Australia looms much larger as both an export mar-
ket and an importer. This is understandable as New Zealand 
seizes its opportunities to free trade with its much larger, more 
populous neighbor. 
The relatively small size, in global terms, of the combined 
Australasian market means that neither nation can afford to be-
come too introspective. Each needs to continue to trade heavily 
with third countries. Currently, the bulk of Australia's and New 
Zealand's trade is with the Pacific Rim-principally the United 
States, Japan, Korea, China and Singapore. I see nothing in the 
emergence of trans-Tasman free trade to curtail this. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Quietly, but surely, Australia and New Zealand have set 
about developing bilateral free trade, an objective achieved in 
July 1990. Protectionist barriers and anti-dumping controls in 
relation to trans-Tasman trade are gone. Antitrust law, often 
69. The five largest export markets for Australia in June 1990 were in U.S. dollars 
(in millions): Japan 829.2; United States 366.9; Korea 205.5; New Zealand 176.6; and 
Singapore 123.3. 
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seen as being at odds with trade policy, has been relied upon as 
a back-up mechanism to ensure that the goals of free trade are 
not undermined by international predatory conduct. Only time 
will reveal whether this imaginative Australasian experiment in 
international trade will prove successful. For those who aspire to 
freer trade on a global basis, one hopes the South Pacific experi-
ence will not let them down. 
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